01 / ISOLATE
Secrets never arrive in the clear.
Every credential is encrypted in the browser before it is written anywhere. The network, if you use one, sees only opaque blobs. There is no plaintext hop. There is no “just this once” exception.
Your own vault of quiet encryption.
{01}
AES-256-GCM · PBKDF2 · NO MASTER KEY
{02} Protocol
Built so that we cannot betray you — even if we wanted to.
PasswordSafely is not a place that stores your passwords. It is a sealed chamber that only you can open. Ciphertext can live on a disk. The meaning of it cannot leave your device.
02 / STRETCH
A passphrase becomes a key the slow way.
Your master secret is stretched with PBKDF2-SHA-256 (310,000 iterations). Brute force is expensive by design. We do not keep a copy, a hint, or a recovery escrow. Forgotten is forgotten — that is the cost of having no backdoor.
03 / SEAL
AES-256-GCM holds the rest.
Authenticated encryption binds integrity to secrecy. Tampering is visible. Silent substitution is not a feature. The vault either opens correctly or it does not open at all.
{03} Specification
A ledger of what is present — and what is deliberately absent.
| Capability | Status | Layer | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zero-knowledge construction | ACTIVE | 01 | Server cannot decrypt |
| Client-side AES-256-GCM | ACTIVE | 02 | Web Crypto, in-browser |
| Passphrase stretching | ACTIVE | 03 | PBKDF2-SHA-256 · 310k |
| High-entropy generator | ACTIVE | 04 | CSPRNG via Web Crypto |
| Local passphrase autopsy | ACTIVE | 05 | Never leaves this tab |
| WebAuthn unlock | READY | 06 | Hardware key path |
| Encrypted sync | OPTIONAL | 07 | Blobs only, never keys |
| Recovery backdoor | ABSENT | 08 | By architecture, not policy |
| Secret analytics | ABSENT | 09 | Nothing to inspect |
{04} The bench
Forge a credential. Seal a secret. Diagnose the key.
Every tool on this bench runs on your device. PasswordSafely does not receive the plaintext, the passphrase, or the autopsy specimen. Close the tab and the working memory is gone.
GEN.01
Credential forge
- Entropy
- —
- Charset
- —
- Source
- CSPRNG
SEAL.02
Local vault
Idle. No key material persisted.
DIAG.03
Autopsy — strength diagnosis
A passphrase is dissected here, not uploaded. Findings stay in this tab: dictionary hits, keyboard walks, calendar years, and a crack-time estimate against throttled, fast, and stretched hashes.
- Class
- —
- Online throttled
- —
- Offline fast hash
- —
- This vault · PBKDF2
- —
Idle. Awaiting a passphrase.
| Signal | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| No specimen. Type a passphrase to begin. | ||
{05} Architecture
A chain with one private end.
The passphrase is yours. The derived key exists only in working memory. The ciphertext is inert without both.
- 01 Passphrase Human secret, never stored
- 02 KDF PBKDF2-SHA-256 · 310,000
- 03 AES key 256-bit, session only
- 04 GCM seal IV + ciphertext + tag
- 05 Blob Safe to rest. Useless alone.
{06} Laboratory
Instruments that stay on the bench.
Twelve live instruments, same law: secrets are not uploaded. The breach check sends only a five-character hash prefix to Have I Been Pwned. Wi-Fi QR is drawn here — never on a public QR factory.
LAB.01 / ENTROPY
Crack-time calculator
Search space, bits, and estimated time against throttled, GPU, and stretched hashes. A physics sheet for a passphrase — not a guess.
LAB.02 / BREACH
Leak telemetry
k-anonymity password check. Email is never stored here; future alerts go through Have I Been Pwned’s own notify service.
LAB.03 / MIGRATE
Vault converter
Chrome, LastPass, Bitwarden, 1Password exports in; another manager’s format out. The file never leaves this tab.
LAB.04 / WI-FI
Guest QR plate
SSID and key become a scannable plate. Print or save as PDF. Do not send the payload to an online QR mill.
LAB.05 / PIN
Pad geometry
4- and 6-digit codes against keypad lines, years, and the famous leak list. A gesture is not a vault.
LAB.06 / DECOY
Honeypot batch
Fake users, passwords, and Luhn-valid test cards, marked DECOY. Bait for a trap you control.
LAB.07 / DERIVE
Site-bound key
One master phrase, a different password per host. Same recipe, same output. The phrase never leaves this tab.
LAB.08 / SPLIT
k-of-n slips
Shamir over GF(256). Any three of five reconstruct. One slip is not the secret. Lose too many and it is gone.
LAB.09 / REUSE
Reuse map
Exact twins, near twins, shared roots. Secrets stay masked in the report. The list is not uploaded.
LAB.10 / DURESS
Forced-open vault
Two passphrases, one blob. The true phrase opens the truth. The other opens a prepared lie. Unseal never names the door.
LAB.11 / STEGO
Field plate
Vault JSON hidden in the grain of a PNG. A landscape, not a payload file. Concealment after encryption — never instead of it.
LAB.12 / QUESTIONS
Question forge
Fake answers for bank forms. Forgettable on purpose, sealable in the vault. A true biography does not belong on a recovery lock.
{07} Access
The vault is already on this device.
No account. No upload. Open the bench, forge what you need, seal what you must keep. When you are done, close the tab. Silence resumes.
Return to the bench{08} FAQ
Questions we can answer without opening the vault.
- Does PasswordSafely store my passwords?
- No. PasswordSafely is local-first. Passphrases, vault plaintext, and laboratory secrets are not uploaded. There is no account and no server that stores your keys.
- Can PasswordSafely recover a forgotten passphrase?
- No. There is no master key, hint, or recovery escrow on the operator’s side. Forgotten is forgotten. That is the product.
- Does the breach check send my password to a server?
- The password itself is not sent. A SHA-1 hash is computed in the tab; only the first five hexadecimal characters go to Have I Been Pwned’s k-anonymity range API, with padding. The rest of the hash never leaves the tab.
- Is PasswordSafely a cloud password manager?
- No. It is a client-side vault and laboratory. Ciphertext can rest on a disk you control. PasswordSafely does not sync, escrow, or read your secrets.